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The	reputation	of	the	euro	and	the	European	Central
Bank:	Interlinked	or	disconnected?
The	Eurozone	crisis	had	a	clear	impact	on	trust	in	the	euro	and	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB).	However,
drawing	on	a	new	study,	Stephanie	Bergbauer,	Nils	Hernborg,	Jean-François	Jamet	and	Eric	Persson	explain
that	there	are	significant	differences	in	the	way	citizens	place	trust	in	the	euro	and	the	ECB.	They	find	that	while
support	for	the	euro	is	primarily	value	based,	trust	in	the	ECB	depends	predominantly	on	citizens’	satisfaction	with
the	EU’s	overall	performance	and	citizens’	outlooks	on	the	economy.
The	financial	and	sovereign	debt	crisis	brought	issues	of	European	economic	and	monetary	integration	to	the	fore
of	political	debates.	These	events	were	also	reflected	in	citizens’	views	on	the	European	single	currency,	the	euro,
as	the	most	visible	outcome	of	economic	and	monetary	integration	in	Europe,	and	the	European	Central	Bank
(ECB)	as	the	institution	tasked	with	setting	monetary	policy	for	the	euro	area	and	maintaining	price	stability.	While
large	majorities	of	citizens	remained	in	favour	of	the	euro	even	at	the	height	of	the	crisis,	trust	in	the	ECB	declined
substantially,	recovering	only	slowly	in	recent	years	(Figure	1).	In	a	recent	paper	we	seek	to	explain	this	divergence
and	identify	drivers	of	support	for	the	euro	and	trust	in	the	ECB	at	the	individual	level.
Figure	1:	Net	support	for	the	euro	and	net	trust	in	the	ECB	in	the	euro	area,	1999-2019
Note:	Net	support	for	the	euro:	%	for	single	currency	minus	%	against	single	currency;	Net	trust	in	the	ECB=	%	‘tend	to	trust	ECB’
minus	%	of	respondents	‘tend	not	to	trust’.	Source:	Eurobarometer	surveys,	own	calculations
The	currency	and	its	central	bank:	mutually	dependent	on	people’s	trust
Understanding	attitudes	towards	the	euro	and	the	ECB	is	important.	People’s	trust	matters.	To	begin	with,	a	lack
confidence	in	the	stability	of	the	currency	would	make	bank	runs	and	inflation	fears	more	likely.	Central	banks	rely
on	steering	public	inflation	expectations	to	fulfil	their	mandate,	requiring	a	high	level	of	trust	in	the	central	bank.
In	the	absence	of	public	support,	central	banks	risk	becoming	vulnerable	to	political	pressures.	Moreover,	public
support	appears	even	more	important	in	the	case	of	EMU	which	is	seen	as	a	test	case	for	citizens’	willingness	to
transfer	core	powers	of	the	nation	state	to	the	European	level.	These	political	bonds	were	crucial	to	maintaining
cohesion	in	the	crisis	when	membership	in	the	euro	area	was	framed	as	creating	winners	and	losers.
Nuances	of	Euroscepticism:	a	closer	look	at	supporters	and	critics	of	EMU
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Using	the	microdata	from	the	Eurobarometer	surveys	we	distinguish	four	types	of	EMU-supporters	and	critics.	The
first	group	of	citizens	neither	supports	the	euro	nor	trusts	the	ECB	–	we	call	this	group	EMU-sceptics.	This	group
appears	the	most	critical	in	view	of	the	long-term	stability	of	EMU.	Lacking	support	for	the	idea	of	economic	and
monetary	integration	per	se,	these	citizens	may	be	open	to	following	anti-euro	or	generally	Eurosceptic	voices
calling	for	a	break-up	of	the	euro	area.
The	second	group,	ECB-sceptics,	supports	the	euro,	but	does	not	trust	the	ECB	and	thus	is	the	most	critical	from
an	ECB	perspective.	These	citizens	appear	to	question	the	legitimacy	of	the	ECB	and	its	policies,	which	may	make
the	central	bank	more	vulnerable	to	political	pressures,	even	if	citizens	in	this	group	still	support	the	single	currency.
The	third	group,	euro-sceptics,	does	not	support	the	euro,	but	trusts	the	ECB.	Lacking	support	for	a	single
European	currency,	they	may	be	open	to	anti-euro	voices,	although	continued	trust	in	the	ECB	may	provide	a	buffer
against	such	arguments.	The	fourth	group,	EMU-supporters,	supports	the	euro	and	trusts	the	ECB	and	thus	is	most
conducive	to	the	long-term	sustainability	of	EMU	from	a	theoretical	perspective.
The	development	of	citizens’	support	for	EMU	since	the	crisis
A	long-term	view	on	the	development	of	the	four	groups	of	EMU-supporters	and	EMU-sceptics	(see	Figure	2)
shows	that	prior	to	the	crisis,	a	relative	majority	of	euro	area	citizens	were	EMU-supporters	(dark	blue	line).	This
group	shrinks	from	the	onset	of	the	financial	and	economic	crisis	in	2008/2009	and	recovers	to	pre-crisis	levels	only
in	2017/2018.	In	parallel,	the	group	supporting	neither	the	euro	nor	the	ECB	also	grows	(red	line).
With	the	crisis,	some	citizens	lost	confidence	in	the	ECB,	but	did	not	necessarily	turn	against	the	single	currency,	as
evidenced	by	the	growing	number	of	those	still	supporting	the	euro,	but	lacking	trust	in	the	ECB	(yellow	line).	The
group	of	citizens	supporting	the	ECB	but	not	the	euro	(grey	line)	is	negligibly	small	across	the	euro	area	and	over
time.	Interestingly	the	share	of	people	without	a	view	on	either	the	euro	or	ECB	(light	blue	line)	decreased	over	the
entire	period,	suggesting	increased	interest	in	matters	related	to	EMU.
Figure	2:	Levels	and	development	of	EMU	support	in	the	euro	area	1999-2019
Source:	Eurobarometer	surveys,	own	calculations
National	publics’	views	on	EMU:	a	reflection	of	different	experiences	of	the	crisis
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Zooming	in	on	the	Member	State	level,	a	first	group	has	kept	a	majority	of	EMU-supporters	since	euro	adoption,
including	during	the	crisis.	This	group	comprises	mainly	north-western	European	countries	and	some	of	the	more
recent	euro	area	member	states	(Austria,	Belgium,	Estonia,	Finland,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	Luxembourg,	Malta,
Netherlands,	Slovakia).	In	a	second	group	(Cyprus,	Greece,	Ireland,	Italy,	Portugal,	Slovenia,	Spain),	public
attitudes	towards	EMU	turned	distinctly	negative	in	the	crisis.	A	third	group	consists	of	the	large	core	economies
France	and	Germany	which	both	have	distinct	attitudinal	patterns	towards	EMU.
How	can	we	explain	the	country-specific	patterns?	One	general	rationale	may	be	differences	in	countries’
experience	of	the	economic	and	financial	crisis	and	public	perceptions	among	national	publics	of	the	ECB	and	its
role	in	the	crisis.	The	first	group	of	countries	weathered	the	crisis	relatively	well,	in	stark	contrast	to	the	second
group	which	includes	countries	that	had	to	enter	into	macroeconomic	adjustment	programmes	or,	like	Slovenia,
experienced	bank	rescues	involving	a	bail-in	of	junior	bond	holders.	In	several	of	these	countries,	the	ECB	was
heavily	criticised	for	its	participation	in	the	troika,	austerity	measures	under	the	adjustment	programmes	and	its	role
in	decisions	regarding	bank	rescues.
France	has	had	a	historically	muted	but	stable	support	for	the	EMU	and	trust	in	the	ECB.	In	Germany,	ECB-
sceptics	have	become	more	numerous	since	the	onset	of	the	financial	crisis	in	2007/2008,	mirroring	the	German
public	debate	in	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis	that	tends	to	highlight	the	adverse	effects	of	ECB	policies,	in	particular
on	savers	and	pensioners.
Figure	3:	Levels	and	development	of	EMU-support	in	euro	area	member	states,	1999-2018
Source:	Eurobarometer
Understanding	people’s	motivations:	values	vs	perceived	performance
Going	back	to	the	initial	puzzle	set	out	in	the	introduction,	we	find	that	support	for	the	euro	is	primarily	value	based:
it	relates	to	feelings	of	European	identity	and	support	for	the	idea	of	European	integration.	Trust	in	the	ECB,	in
contrast,	depends	predominantly	on	citizens’	satisfaction	with	the	EU’s	overall	performance	and	citizens’	outlooks
on	the	economy.	This	suggests	that	trust	in	the	ECB	may	be	slow	to	recover	for	as	long	as	the	memory	of	the	crisis
continues	to	impact	citizens’	assessment	of	the	EU’s	performance.
We	also	find	that	assessments	of	specific	EU	crisis	measures	affect	both	dimensions	of	EMU:	in	particular,	the	EU’s
perceived	failure	to	protect	citizens	and	achieve	fair	burden	sharing	in	the	crisis	affects	support	for	the	euro,
suggesting	that	the	single	currency	is	also	associated	with	values	of	fairness	and	protection	which	many	citizens
saw	as	lacking	in	the	EU’s	handling	of	the	crisis.	In	contrast,	the	comparatively	stronger	effect	of	the	EU’s	failure	to
hold	the	financial	sector	to	account	on	ECB	trust	may	indicate	concerns	about	the	ECB’s	perceived	closeness	to
the	financial	sector	who	many	view	as	the	main	culprits	of	the	financial	crisis.
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Overall,	our	findings	suggest	that	value-based	support	has	been	critical	during	the	crisis	in	ensuring	continued
public	support	for	EMU	despite	perceptions	of	underperformance.	More	broadly,	they	reinforce	the	case	that
economic	integration	is	more	sustainable	if	it	is	based	on	a	sense	of	stability,	fairness	and	togetherness.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	study	in	the	Journal	of	European	Public	Policy
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	The	views	expressed	are	those	of	the	authors,	they	do	not	necessarily	reflect	those
of	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	and	should	not	be	reported	as	such.	Featured	image	credit:	European	Central
Bank	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
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